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T H E  T R O T T E R  R E V I E W
The NAACP in the  
Twenty-first Century
dianne M. Pinderhughes
A version of this article appeared in the June 1995 issue of Focus, a publication 
of the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies in Washington, D.C.
 “The leadership was overly concerned with recognition from whites, 
a concern that helped prevent the organization from taking a confrontational 
stance. The program overly oriented to a middle-class agenda and not nearly 
strong enough to the kinds of economic issues that mean most to working-
class black people. [And] the organization [was] too centralized.”
 These views of the problems of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People are not those of a present-day critic, 
reflecting on the Association’s recent woes. They were formed by Ella 
Baker during her years as the NAACP’s assistant field secretary in 1941 
and as National Director of Branches from 1943 to 1946, as summarized 
in Charles Payne’s book I’ve Got the Light of Freedom, published in 1995. 
Yet Baker’s assessment fits extraordinarily well with some of the issues 
that have called into question the viability and continued relevance of the 
NAACP as it faces its centennial in 2009.
 During its first six decades, the NAACP pursued a program 
that focused on an anti-lynching campaign, school desegregation, and 
voting rights. Often working in coalition with other groups, the Associa-
tion achieved many of its civil rights objectives. But from the 1970s, the 
Association seemed to have stagnated and lost its vision.
 In his short tenure as executive director of the NAACP, Ben 
Chavis attempted to revitalize the Association by reaching out to a broader 
constituency. He argued that class is a polarizing factor in the Association, 
Col. G. O. Cress, Southern Department inspector, agreed on lack of 
discipline, but thought discrimination the fundamental cause. 
 Colonel Cress’s broadened investigation led to more arrests and 
the scheduling of three courts-martial at San Antonio between November 
1917 and March 1918. U.S. v. Sgt. William C. Nesbit et al. tried 63 defendants 
on charges of mutiny, murder, and felonious assault; U.S. v. Cpl. John Wash-
ington et al. judged fifteen members of the guard who abandoned Camp 
Logan; and U.S. v. Cpl. Robert Tillman et al. heard later evidence on the 
main column, incriminating 40 additional soldiers. Defense attorney Maj. 
Harry H. Grier pinned responsibility on the deceased Henry, but argued 
that most reacted from confusion and fear of comrades or a mob. The 
prosecution argued equal guilt in a conspiracy to kill whites indiscrimi-
nately. The Nesbit and Tillman trials convicted 95, imposing twenty-four 
death sentences and eighteen prison terms ranging from two to eighteen 
years. The army carried out thirteen executions by hangings within less 
than two weeks after the first trial. Public outcry from organizations such 
as the NAACP and National Equal Rights League persuaded President 
Woodrow Wilson to commute ten death sentences to prison terms the 
following year. The Washington proceedings ordered five executions and 
ten sentences of seven to ten years. President Warren Harding initiated 
the clemency process that freed most prisoners within ten years and the 
last by 1938.
 The episode damaged race relations locally and nationally. An 
investigator for the NAACP reported that numerous black Houstonians 
refused to comment from fear of the police. Its organ, The Crisis, edited by 
W. E. B. DuBois, emphasized the abusive treatment of the soldiers while 
admitting the gravity of their deeds. Intensified race consciousness led 
to the creation of a Houston chapter of the NAACP and the Civic Betterment 
League of Harris County. The War Department disbanded the Third 
Battalion after the war. 
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economic status of minority groups. The organization has also developed 
several educational programs for young people and economic development 
projects.
 But the Association’s ability to meet its multifaceted missions is 
impeded by cumbersome organizational and leadership structures. It is 
governed by a 64-member board of directors, a national chairperson, an 
executive director, and six vice presidents. National headquarters are in 
Baltimore. There is a legislative department in the Washington Bureau, a 
development office in New York City, and other offices around the country. 
The association divided the nation into seven regions, each headed by a 
regional director, and regional representatives who serve on the national 
board. There are conferences of branches within each state, with about 
1,700 local branches and 400 college chapters and youth councils. At 
the end of Rev. Benjamin Hooks’s term as executive director in 1992, the 
Association employed approximately 100 staff members, but financial 
problems led to cuts and layoffs.
 The Association’s size and its many layers of organization 
frustrate efficient policymaking. Policy is formulated by the national 
board and national office and at the NAACP’s annual convention. Once 
adopted, a policy is passed down a chain of command that extends 
from the national office to state conferences, and then to local branches. 
Local branches are not expected to challenge policies handed down by 
the convention, board, or national office.
 On the other hand, the NAACP’s bureaucratic structure also 
ensures a collective institutional memory, an understanding of what 
strategies have already been employed in a particular policy area, or in a 
state or city over a relatively long period of time. The organization’s size 
and structure also mean that it operates in most locations regardless of 
the size of the black population. This provides opportunities for informa-
tion flow: upward to the states and the regions and to the national office 
about problems, issues and conflicts, as well as about the innovative and 
successful efforts at the grassroots; across states and regions and through 
the national office and back to the other states; or downward from the 
national office to the regions, states, and local branches.
 This complex bureaucratic structure means the NAACP has 
the potential to influence public policy formation as it occurs in most 
because it is dominated by the middle-aged and “upper-class” sector of 
the black community, which he saw as uninterested in the problems of 
gang members and low-income blacks. Chavis was criticized when he 
met in March 1994 with black nationalists and representatives from the 
Pan-African groups such as Angela Davis, Lenora Fulani, Cornell West, 
and Louis Farrakhan. At that meeting, they discussed how they might 
make common cause with the NAACP.
 Projecting into the future, the NAACP can do a great deal if 
its leadership can reshape the Association to enable it to address the 
concerns of a broader segment of black America.
 In the last 30 years, the NAACP’s influence as a national pressure 
group has declined. It has been eclipsed by a growing number of black 
elected officials and their increasing political clout. And the influence 
of the NAACP has been diluted by a welter of newer organizations that 
have joined the civil rights coalition. The organization’s internal programs 
have also taken their toll. In the mid-1990s, the Association was rocked 
by scandal and an internal power struggle revolving around charges of 
sexual harassment and financial mismanagement against former execu-
tive director Ben Chavis, leading to his removal from office. There also was 
a very public and successful challenge against William Gibson by Myrlie 
Evers-Williams for the board chairmanship.
 Few disagree that the Association is facing serious and 
complex problems, but options for restoring the organization to its former 
prominence vary widely. Some view the Association’s problems as so 
monumental that they recommend starting over from scratch. Others 
see the organization’s condition as serious but manageable with direct 
attention. Even if the Association succeeds in addressing its philosophi-
cal dilemmas, it must overcome serious organizational and financial 
management difficulties.
 The Association is often described as hierarchical, bureaucratic, 
and slow to respond to new problems. It is. The size of the organization, 
its multiple levels of leadership, and the breadth and complexity of its 
mandate make swift response to changing events difficult.
 The NAACP’s goals include keeping the public aware of 
the adverse effects of racial discrimination, and taking lawful action to 
secure its elimination while improving the political, educational, social, and 
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decades, and has become one of only a few black-led national organizations 
focused on public policymaking. 
 In the “struggle” years of protest and demonstration in the 1960s, 
the focus of the movement was clearly racial discrimination. In more 
recent years, that focus has expanded to include race, gender, physical 
disability, age, and sexual preference. Some of these concerns are multiple-
jeopardy issues that have complicated what seemed originally to have 
been a single focus. For example, sexual harassment proved an explosive 
issue for African-American organizations when Judge Clarence Thomas 
was nominated to the Supreme Court. Anita Hill’s allegations about 
Thomas’s inappropriate behavior when he chaired the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission split African-American organizations and 
diverted the focus of his Senate confirmation hearing away from civil 
rights concerns as traditionally defined.
 Since the peak of the civil rights protest era, a large number of 
new, progressive racial-ethnic organizations modeled on the NAACP have 
been formed that focus on the rights of women, homosexuals, people with 
physical impairments, and non-black racial minorities. These include the 
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the National 
Organization for Women, and the Disability Rights Education & Defense 
Fund, to name a few. Most of these groups are part of an expanded civil 
rights coalition. But, although they may share the same general civil rights 
philosophy, they each have their own agenda. The growth in the number 
of such organizations has diffused the influence of the NAACP. 
 In order to operate on a common front in the policy arena, the 
NAACP must negotiate with its coalition partners on which issues should 
have the highest priority and what strategy would be most effective. 
 Simultaneously, a number of conservative public interest law 
firms, foundations and other interest groups have been created like the 
Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute, the Institute for Justice, the Free 
Congress Foundation, and the Washington Legal Foundation (which 
represented a Latino plaintiff ’s successful court challenge to the Univer-
sity of Maryland’s Banneker Scholarship program for black students). The 
missions of many of these groups is to attack and dilute the policies of 
affirmative action, voting rights, and equal educational opportunity that 
the NAACP and its allies have struggled to put in place.
governmental bodies at any level—national, state, or local. These 
entities, which communicate with each other and with the national office, 
constitute a structure compatible with the “federal government” and with 
the capacity to address problems of the NAACP’s constituency at all levels. 
The Milwaukee branch, for example, won a major lawsuit with national 
implications in the area of housing discrimination.
 The Association receives financial support from corporate contribu-
tions, its annual conventions, dues and donations from members, and founda-
tion grants. After revelations in 1994 that Executive Director Chavis committed 
over $300,000 of NAACP funds to settle a lawsuit in which he was charged with 
sexual harassment of a female employee, the Association’s income from indi-
vidual supports and foundations fell off dramatically. Then-Chairman Gibson’s 
possible involvement in Chavis’s financial problems, as well as his resistance to 
reporting on the financial status of the Association, raised questions about his 
accountability and competence to handle the organization’s affairs. Late that 
year, the NAACP had insufficient funds to pay its staff, and employees were 
furloughed for eight weeks.
 The Ford Foundation withheld nearly $500,000 in funds until the 
leadership crisis was resolved. Other corporate and foundation donors, 
as well as individuals, also suspended financial support in response to the 
Chavis scandal and questions over Chairman Gibson’s leadership. 
 The Association’s financial problems had been developing 
for some time. In the early 1980s, when the Association could no longer 
afford to maintain its national offices in Manhattan, it was forced to move 
to Brooklyn. That proved a temporary solution, however, and in 1986 the 
Association moved its national offices again, to Baltimore, with help from 
the state of Maryland and that city’s government.
 In addition to its organizational and financial problems, the 
NAACP faces a far more complex environment than it once did. During 
the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, the NAACP and other 
organizations, including the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith; the 
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, the black union founded by A. Phillip 
Randolph; and other groups that did not necessarily have the civil rights 
agenda as their first priority, formed the Leadership Conference for Civ-
il Rights to work for racial reform. The NAACP was founded by blacks 
and whites, evolved with the support of black communities over several 
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5. The jurisdiction and financial support of the Washington Bureau 
should be enhanced to expand the NAACP’s influence on national 
policy.
 The NAACP has an impressive legacy and must be credited as a 
major force in the struggle to secure major civil rights gains in the 1950s 
and 1960s. Despite its weaknesses and internal problems, the Association 
has the potential to once again stand as a preeminent advocate for civil 
rights. For that to happen, however, the organization has to be radically 
restructured and find a way to achieve financial stability. But perhaps 
most important, the NAACP must recast itself so that is mission addresses 
the issues of the day and the concerns of a broader spectrum of black 
America. Whether the NAACP’s new leadership is up to this task is what 
many are asking. 
 These conservative groups have waged a powerful campaign to 
roll back the gains in equality secured by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Executive Order 11246, which codified federal 
affirmative action policy, and the other statutes and executive orders for 
which the NAACP and sister civil rights organizations had fought.
 Through litigation, conservative groups have convinced the 
U.S. Supreme Court to hand down rulings that restrict the implementation 
of minority business set-aside programs by state and local governments 
as in the City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. of 1989. The U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Adarand v. Pena decision in 1995 went even further to restrict 
federal set-asides and also places affirmative action programs at a high-
er level of judicial scrutiny. And the high court’s Shaw v. Reno ruling in 
1993 imperiled several majority-black congressional districts in South-
ern states, with restrictions requiring that they be “narrowly tailored to 
further a compelling government interest.” 
 Now that Julian Bond has become chair of the NAACP board, he 
and the Association face a number of important choices. The organiza-
tion must plan carefully for the short and long term in all of these areas:
1. If the Association is to succeed in its second century, its policies 
must address the interests of a broader constituency. The policy 
arenas in which the NAACP has been active may be too numerous; 
the Association may have to select fewer on which to focus.
2. Benjamin Todd Jealous and whoever succeeds him as president and 
CEO should exhibit a variety of strengths, including considerable 
ability in financial management, and be a person who can listen to 
a complex array of voices within the Association and within black 
America.
3. The Association must develop short- and long-range plans to 
implement a more manageable governance structure.
4. Julian Bond and the board should begin with the president and CEO 
to map out plans for an endowment and revamp the organization’s 
fundraising program. The national fundraising campaign should be 
coordinated with the fundraising campaigns of larger local chapters.
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